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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UAH
<=H_\l~l )?\

ROBERTS,
Plnintif f and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

TIL\CK\VORK CONSTRUCTION

10862

CCIMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

An action by plaintiff for personal injuries sustained while she was operating an automobile which
collided with a railroad track installed by defendant at the Tooele Army Depot.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The jury returned a special verdict finding,
inter alia, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence. The trial court entered judgment on
the verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff
moved for a new trial which was denied.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the J·ud
f
th
· 1 court entered on the jury verdict.
gmenr,
o
e t ria
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except for. the statements relative to the iclentl ty of the parties and the time of the accident, drf endant cannot accept plaintiff's statement of facb
due to the argumentative context in which thev a1.,.
recited.
·
.

Defendant contends that the uncontrovertecl
facts of this case are as follows :
Plaintiff was traveling west on a roadway in
the Tooele Army Depot which crossed over two seb
of railroad tracks running north and south whid1
were the subject of defendant's contract with the
United States Government.
The roadway on which plaintiff was traveling
at the time of the accident is substantially higher
immediately east of the ralroad tracks than where
the road crosses the tracks, and the roadway decline~
sharply down to the level of the railroad tracks when
one is traveling on it in a westerly direction ( T. Si88, 90-91, 97 and profile appearing on Exh. 30).
Also, there is a slight down grade between the east
set of tracks and the west set of tracks, the west
set being approximately 9Yz inches lower than the
east set (Tr. 94) . The distance between the two
2

-.;d:-;

of tracks is approximately 8 feet 1O inches

( Exh. :30).

The speed limit on the rnaclway m·er which

pl:1intiff ,~:as traveling at the time of the accident
'\;1s 21) mph (T. 99).
ln crnssing over the two sets of rairoad tracks
the cross-member of the frame of plaintiff's automonile struck the surface of the roadway approximately
;11idwa~· between the two sets of railrnad tracks (T.
~r:>-~H) & Exh. 24:) and then struck the west most runrn ng rai 1 of the west set of tracks ( T. 77) and disJ,1dgecl two 39-foot lengths of rail (T. 78-79). The
p(1int uf impact was near the point where the two 39f\iot rails had been joined together with a joint bar
(Exh. 29). After the impact, plaintiff drove her
,1momobile over the rail which she had just struck
·,·.-ithont striking it again (T. 23), although the impact had raised the rail higher than it was at the
time of impact (T. 71-72 & Exhs. 1 & 29).
The work which defendant company was doing
under its contract with the United States Government consisted of replacing the existing 66 pound
rnnning rails (those on which the trains operate)
\vi th 90 pound rails, including the necessary tieplates,
joint bars, bolts, etc., and removing the crossing rails
(those between the running rails) and refilling the
area bet\veen the running rails with concrete. HowP\·er, clefendant company was not to remove or alter
3

the ties or make any changes in the railroact tr«c:i
road-bed (Tr. 66-67).
c, ,
On the date of the accident in question, the dt··
fendant had completed installation of the ne\\ (11 ,
pound running rails at the intersection where tlii
accident occurred, but the crossing rails had not \'tt
been removed and replaced with conc1·ete. The ~h1
running rails had been fully seated and spiked in
place ( T. 69 & 86). The new running rails st 0,,I!
approximately 1IA inches higher than the crossing
rails between them (T. 68). The impact of plaintiff's automobile against the east side of the west
running rail lifted the said rail and allowed fill
gravel to fall in under the rail, thereby raising it
out of its normal position (T. 71-72 & Exh. 29).
This gravel had to be removed before the rail could
be reset after the accident ( T. 79).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FIND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Defendant contends that there is no evidence
in the record which would sustain a finding that
the defendant was guilty of negligence, a fortiori,
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law. The essence of plaintiff's alleged
cause of action is that the defendant, "negligently
and carelessly . . . raised a certain railroad track
4

:wpro:\imately three inches aboYe its nonnal posi[ion." (R.l pa1·. 3). The sole issue of alleged negli:..:•·ncc on the part of the defendant which was to
lw cktermined at the time of trial was set forth in
paragraph :3 of the Pre-trial Orde1· as follows:
''Plaintiff alleges that defendant \Vas negligt>nt in that defendant left a track that \Vas
being installed, raised to such a height, that
it constituted a hazard" (R. 7) .
.\!though plaintiff represents in her brief in
fr:e S~atement of Facts that there is evidence to the
,_,-ffect that before the accident in question occurred,
(idemlant had left one of the rails projecting three
ti four inches above the other rail, no citation to
the record was made for this representation and,
1n fact, there was no evidence produced at the trial
~u support this allegation. The plaintiff admitted
under cross examination that the photographs
( Exhs. 1 & 2) which were introduced by her counsel
during her direct examination tending to show an
extended height of the west running rail were, in
fact, taken after the accident had occurred ( T. 14).
1

Contrasted with such evidence, Mr. Frank Morgan, superintendent of defendant company, testified
that he had personally inspected the entire length
of track in question after the new 90 pound running
rails had been installed and determined that the
rails had been fully seated and spiked and that this
work had been completed prior to the accident ( T. 69
& 86). Mr. Morgan explained that a 90 pound rail
5

sitting on an appropriate tie plate would ext ,
approximately 1% inches higher on the ties than ~~c,
66 pounds rails which had been replaced ( T. 68). 1 ~
order to install the larger running rails, it was nee'.
essary to remove the nearest inside crossing i·ail
which evacuated a space of seven or eight inche~
on the inboard side of each running rail. This area
·was filled with gravel until such time as all of the
crossing rails could be removed and the area between
the two running rails filled with concrete. Mr. Mor.
gan testified that he inspected the crossings daily
to insure that there was sufficient gravel in the~
areas, as did one of the staff from the Depot Engineer's Office (T. 70). No complaints had ever bePn
registered with Mr. Morgan regarding defendant's
maintenance of these areas during the construction
period (T. 71).

1

Certainly, it could not be said that the procedure of installing running rails which were 1114
inches higher than the crossing rails adjacent to ,
them and the filling of the space between such rails '
with gravel until all of the crossing rails could be
removed and replaced with concrete was negligence
as a matter of law.
To the contrary, the jury unanimously found in
answering Propositions Nos. 1 and 2 of the special
verdict that the defendant did not create an unreasonable hazard by leaving a rail projecting too
high ( R. 12) . The height of the west running. r~il
as shown in the photographs marked as Exh1b1ts
6

: and 2 is easily explained by the testimony of Mr.
Morgan that the impact of plaintiff's automobile
1m the east side of the west rail raised the rail up
and tilted it to the west allowing some of the fill
gra''el which had been placed along side the rail, as
1iJentioned above, to fall in under the rail and lift
it abo1·e the normal position it occupied on the ties
hrfore the accident occurred (T. 71-72 & Exh. 29).
This fact is substantiated by Mr. Morgan's testiwony that this gravel had to be removed from under
the west running rail before it could be reset after
the accident (T. 79).
The jury did answer Proposition No. 3 of the
::pecial verdict to the effect that defendant was neglii~ent in not warning the plaintiff by signs or other'>Vise uf the danger in crossing the railroad tracks.
This finding, however, is meaningless with respect to
che duty of the defendant since the jury found that
the defendant did not create a hazard at the crossing
with respect to the rails which it had installed. The
crossing was a hazardous crossing because of the
abrupt fall in the grade of the road immediately
east of the two railroad tracks for a vehicle approaching the crossing from the east. This grade can be
seeen to some extent by the lay of the land as shown
in Exhibit 2, which is a photograph looking north
along the railroad tracks. The grade is also indicated, although not to scale, in the profile drawn by
the investigating officer in Exhibit No. 30, and is
a fact which was recognized by everyone at the trial
7

of the case, including plaintiff's counsel as inclic t,
1
· h"is cross examination
·
in
of Mr. Morgan ( T. 87).a er
However, the ~r~de of the road was not altered
by the defendant in its work upon the railroad track
In fact, the defendant made no changes with respe s;
to the roadbed of the railroad tracks, but mere~v
replaced the existing 66 pound rails with 90 poun~1
rails, without disturbing the ties on which they were
laid ( T. 66-67). If the defendant, as the jury found,
did not create a hazard in the installation of the
new rails, then there was nothing of which it was
obligated to warn the plaintiff, and the special verdict should have been worded so that the jury would
be required to answer Proposition No. 3, only if they
answered Propositions Nos. 1 or 2 in the affirmative.
The mere fact that the railroad tracks being
worked upon by defendant company crossed a road
which contained a hazardous dip in the area of the
railroad tracks did not create a special duty on the
part of the defendant to warn motorists using the
road since the dip was a condition which could
readily be seen by those using the road and the condition itself gave as much warning of the peril as
would a sign referring to it. This general prin·
ciple is acknowledged in 38 American Jurispm
ence, Negligence, Section 91, which reads as follows:
"DANGERS KNOvVN, PATENT, OR OBVIOUS TO INJURED PERSON. - There
is no absolute duty of giving warning of any
8

particular peril; the necessity therefor depends upon the age, intelligence and information of those to ~h01~ the .warning might be
due a~d. the obligation d~sappears entirely
where it is shmvn that the mjured person did
in fact fully appreciate the peril. So in respect of such peril as may be said to be ~bvious
to the injured jerson, there is no obligation
to give any sort of warning. He may be held
guilty of contributory negligence because of
his failure to protect himself against obvious
perils. Although a duty rests upon a municipality, where an obstruction is permitted
to remain on a highway or street, to give
notice to the traveling public of its presence,
yet, no other notice is needed than a view of
the obstruction itself, where it can be seen
in ample time to avoid injury.... "
There is no question but that the plaintiff was
generally familiar with the area where the accident
occurred since she had ridden over the road the
preYious days as a passenger in Mrs. Cherry's automobile ( T. 19 & 30), and she admitted being able
to see the railroad crossing and the down grade of .
the road leading into it as she approached it on the
day of the accident (T. 22-23). Therefore, technically speaking, even if the defendant had created
the hazardous dip in the roadway in which the railroad tracks were situated, a:qy failure of the defendant to warn this particular plaintiff of the condition could not be a proximate cause of the accident
since she knew of the condition before the accident
and could see it as she approached the place where
the accident occurred.
9

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JU~y S
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

As mentioned, but not fully discussed undei
the preceeding point, the real cause of the accidcn~
in question was the fact that the plaintiff failul
to observe or appreciate the abrupt dip in the road\vay as she approached the railroad crossing and
was traveling too fast as she drove into the dip anti
across the railroad tracks. The sudden dip in the
roadway caused the front suspension system of
plaintiff's automobile to bounce up and down and
the cross-member of the frame struck low center at
least twice. Once when it struck the macadam surf ace of the roadway between the two sets of tracks
and the second time when it struck the west running
rail of the west track.
The investigating officer testified that he found
a fresh scrape in the macadam surface of the road
which measured 21112 inches long by 7112 inches wide
(T. 95 & Exh. 30) approximately midway between
the two sets of tracks; and upon examining plaintiff's automobile, he found macadam on the crossmember of the frame ( T. 96) .
Mr. Kenneth Shefeski, automotive expert from
Independent Automobile Damage Appraisers, testified it was mechanically possible for the cross-member on an automobile of the make and model of
plaintiff's automobile to come into contact with the
10

surf ace of the road if sufficient pressure were exerted upon the front suspension system (T. 108).
However, the jury did not need to rely solely upon
his examination and findings since the investigating
officed had actually f oud macadam on the crossmember of plaintiff's automobile which eliminated
any doubt as to whether or not it struck the surface
of the roadway before it struck the rail in question.
The automobile had been driven for 61,441 miles
before the accident, apparently without replacement
of the original shock absorbers ( T. 21) and the
front tires were almost bald ( Exh. 21 & 22), which
decreased the normal distance between the under
carriage of the automobile and the surface of the
mad. Exhibit No. 23, a photograph of the front
undercarriage of the automobile, shows only a few
inches of clearance between the bottom of the crossmember. and the ground. Considering these conditions, it is not hard to understand how the excessive
spted of plaintiff's automobile as it was driven into
the dip of the roadway caused the front end to bounce
and strike the surface of the road and then the
railroad track in question.
Regarding the speed of plaintiff's automobile,
Mr. Kay Hanson, a mechanical engineer, testified
that at the time of the accident he was employed
in the Facilities Branch of Engineering Division
at Tooele Army Depot and went to the scene of the
accident and made a determination of the speed at
which plaintiff's automobile had to have been travel11

in~ at the tim: of impact in order to pull up the
rail and the spikes to the extent that he found th
a~fter the accident. The factors taken into conside::~
tion
Mr. Hans?n in his calculations were detailed
by him for the Jury (T. 101) and the jury very
properly could have accepted his conclusion that
plaintiff's automobile was traveling over 25 mph at
the time of impact. The speed limit on this particular road was 20 mph at the time of the accident
according to the investigating officer (T. 99); and
defendant contends that the reasonable speed for
driving into the sharp dip in the roadway and across
the railroad tracks would be even less than the general speed limit posted for that particular road.

?Y

Although the plaintiff testified she was traveling between 10 to 15 mph at the time of the accident, she admitted on cross examination that at the
time of the accident she was under the impression
that the speed limit was 35 mph (T. 22), and even
at the time of trial she was of the opinion that the
speed limit at the time of the accident was 30 mph.
In the light of the evidence concerning how the
accident occured and the mathematical calculations
made by Mr. Hanson which showed a speed at impact of approximately twice that which the plaintiff
claimed to have been traveling, the jury could reasonably find, as they did in answering Proposition No.
6, that "the plaintiff was contributorily negligent i~
that she was driving too fast for the general condition of the road" ( R. 12).
12

Also, Mrs. Cherry, who was riding as a passenger
in plaintiff's automobile at the time of the accident,
admitted on cross examination that the plaintiff
drove over the railroad tracks considerably faster
than she, Mrs. Cherry, had on the day preceeding the
accident. When asked the question, "So, whatever
the speed limit was that Mrs. Roberts was driving
the next day it was considerably faster than you
<lrove the day before," she responded, "Yes, but she
kept realizing the condition of that railroad track."
(T. 31). Mrs. Cherry contended that she was traveling only two miles per hour when she crossed the
railroad tracks the day preceeding the accident and
that the plaintiff was traveling only 13 miles per
hour faster when she crossed the tracks at the time
of the accident. However, her prejudice in answering questions under cross examination is obvious
from the record and was probably due to the fact
that at the time of trial Mrs. Cherry's claim for
damages against the defendant was still pending as
evidenced by the testimony of her attorney who was
called as a defense witness to establish this fact
(T. 114-115). In any event the substance of her
testimony was that the plaintiff was traveling considerably faster when she crossed the tracks at the
time of the accident than Mrs. Cherry was when she
crossed them the day before. Therefore, the jury
could reasonably have found that Mrs. Cherry's
speed was reasonable under the circumstances and
that the plaintiff's was not.
13

Regardless of all other testimony bearing on th
question of plaintiff's speed, the uncontrovert ~
· 1 f acts foun~ by the investigating officer eu
p h ys1ca
at
the scene of the accident show that plaintiff's automobile came into the dip at such a speed that th
. 1
e
vertica movement in the front end suspension
system caused the cross member of plaintiff's automobile to strike the surface of the roadway approximately 91h feet before it ever struck the rail in question. (Calculated from testimony at T. 90 & Exh.
30). Unless plaintiff was traveling too fast for the
existing conditions of the roadway (the dip), wh~,
did her automobile come down with enough fom
to strike the surf ace of the road 9Yz feet before she
struck the rail? Certainly, this evidence standing
alone would support the jury's finding under Proposition No. 6 that the plaintiff was traveling too fast
for the general condition of the road in the area
where the accident occurred.
With respect to the evidence supporting defendant's allegation and the jury's finding under
Proposition No. 5 that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent in that she failed to keep a proper lookout,
the plaintiff testified that there were no objects
blocking her view of the trackbed, which is in the
dip area (T. 22), or of the down-grade leading to
it (T. 23). Defendant submits that general experience justifies the inference that when one looks in
the direction of an object clearly visible that he sees
it and that when there is evidence to the effect that
'
14

1

1

1

1

one did look but did not heed that which was in plain
dew, it follows that either some part of the evidence
is untrue, or that the person was negligently inattentive.
In this case, the plaintiff is on the horns of a
dilemmea. If she did see the dip, she should have
slowed down for it; if she did not see the dip, which
was in plain view, then she was negligently inattentive. She has to be negligent in one particular or the
other since there is no question but that plaintiff's
automobile traversed the dip area much too fast for
the existing conditions of the roadway as evidenced
by the fact that the cross-member of the automobile
struck the surface of the road and made a gouge in
it 21% inches long some 9¥2 feet before her automobile ever came in contact with the rail in question.
Another fact to be noted is that after impact
when the rail was actually higher than before impact because of the fill gravel which had· gotten
under it at the time of impact (T. 71 & 75), the
plaintiff was able to drive her automobile over the
rail without difficulty and stop west of the track
bed ( T. 23). If the rail had been too high, per se,
the cross-member would have again struck the rail,
but it did not.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT ON
JURY VERDICT.

After a jury has returned a verdict, either gen15

eral
or special, it is the trial court's duty to en te r
.
Judgement thereon so long as there is credible ·
. h
ev1.
d ence in
t
e
record
to
support
the
verdict
or
f"
d
.
In .
ings, as the case may be, or unless error was con .
mitted which had an adverse affect upon the tri~l
to the extended that one can say that there is
reasonable likelihood that the result would have bee:
1
different in the absence of such error. Ri·vas u.,
Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2-d
990 (1964), Brunson vs. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364
412 P.2d 451 (1966), Hall vs. Blackham, 18 Utah
2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966).
In determining whether or not there is suffi.
cient evidence to support a verdict or a finding, the
evidence, or any conflict in the evidence must be
i·eviewed in the light most favorable to the jurv
verdict or findings. Smith vs. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2cl
344, 400 P.2d 570 ( 1965), Efco Distributing, Inc.
vs. Parrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P. 2d 615 (1966),
Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 135, 417
P.2d 643 (1966).
The fact that the jury's answer to Proposition
No. 3 is somewhat inconsistent with its answers to
Propositions Nos. 1 and 2 as discussed above under
Point I, does not give rise to a right for a new trial
since even if the jury had found that the defendant
was negligent in creating a hazard in their answerR
to Propositions Nos. 1 or 2, the judgment on the
special verdict would still be the same since t?e jury
found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
16

nqrligence in two particulars in their answers to
Propositions Nos. 5 and 6. Therefore, if there was
any error in the wording of the special verdict subrni tted by the court in allowing the jury to answer
Proposition No. 3 without first answering Prposition Nos. 1 or 2 affirmatively, the error was harmless in that it did not affect the final judgment
~·endered on the total special verdict. Certainly, the
plaintiff was not prejudiced by the wording of Proposition No. 3. If any prejudice occurred in the wording of said proposition, it was in favor of the plaintiff and adverse to the defendant. However, there
is no evidence or inference in the record that the
'1\-ording of Proposition No. 3 affected the substantial rights of either party to this action.

Jf the substantial rights of the parties were
not affected, minor errors of the trial court are not
grounds for reversal or a new trial. In LeBouthillier
vs. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 178,
417 P.2d 756 (1966) the trial court gave one instruction which may have been erroneous, but which,
in view of all of the other instructions and the evidence, did not affect the substantial right of the
parties. On appeal the verdict of the jury and judgment entered thereon was affirmed and the principle regarding substantial rights was stated as follows:
"The court did give certain instructions to
the jury defining correctly the principal of
'proximate cause' and, although it might be
17

concluded the court erred in giving the in.
struction quoted above, in view of the evidenc
and all the instructions taken together, it i~
our opinion that the error did not adversek
affect the substantial rights of the parties an~l
is not prejudicial. Unless an error is prejudicial a judgment will not be reversed by this
court."
The case of King vs. Vets Cab, Inc., 295 P.2d
605 (Kan. 1956), cited by appellant, is distinguishable from the instant case since in the former, as
stated by the Kansas Supreme Court, "the jury did
not find by direct answer that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence." In the instant
case, the jury found that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence in two specific instances as
answered directly in Propositions Nos. 5 and 6.
The parties having been afforded a trial, 2,
presumption arises that the judgment is correct and
proper and should not be disturbed unless the one
attacking it meets the burden of showing substantial
and prejudicial error. In Robinson vs. Hreinson, 17
Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 ( 1965) at page 267, this
principle was stated as follows:
"The parties have had what they were en·
titled to: a full and fair opportunity to pre·
sent their contentions and evidence support·
18

ing them to the court and jury. When this
has been done all presumptions are in favor of
the validity of the verdict and judgment."
CONCLUSION
The jury specifically found in answering Propo::-:ition Nos. 1 and 2 that the defendant was not
negligent in the particulars alleged in plaintiff's
complaint and delineated as issues for trial, i.e.,
installing a railroad track at a height which constituted a hazard. Therefore, the finding of the jury
in Proposition No. 3, that the defendant was negligent in failing to warn is meaningless and superfluous with respect to the defendant since the defendant created no hazard. Any hazard existing
at the railroad crossing was due to the abrupt dip
in the grade of the road, which was not constructed
by the defendant and over which the defendant had
no control, and consequently no duty.
The jury found that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence in ( 1) failing to keep
a reasonable lookout for road conditions and (2)
traveling too fast for conditions of the road. There
was credible evidence introduced at the trial which
would support the jury's findings on those propositions; and the jury having so found, such evidence
must now be viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict. The appellant has cited no substantial or prejudicial error in the record which
would create a reasonable inference that the verdict
19

would have been different in its absence. Therefort'
the substantial rights of the parties were not affecter!' '
and respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court as entered on the jury verdict
should be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH.
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondent
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